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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RON BENSON, : 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS and : Case No. 20080579-CA 
TRAINING COUNCIL, DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Through the administrative process, it was determined that Benson was 
erroneously granted certification as a peace officer based on false or misleading 
information that he provided or that others provided on his behalf. Were the respondents 
estopped from deciding that Benson's request for certification should have been refused 
because he had been erroneously certified? 
1 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondents 
agree with the petitioner that he preserved this issue below. In deciding questions of 
equitable estoppel, considerable deference is given to the trier of fact and its decision is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank. 2007 UT 56, f 19, 181 P.3d 
791; Hone v. Hone. 2004 UT App 241, % 10, 95 P.3d 1221. 
2. POST Council accepted the administrative law judge's recommendation as to 
what action it should take. R. 757. In the final agency action, the Director of Peace 
Officer Standards and Training restated this as adopting the findings of facts and 
conclusions of law and recommended order of the administrative law judge. R. 386. Did 
the final agency action fail to state the decision of the council to the point that this Court 
should amend or alter it? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondents 
agree with the petitioner that he preserved this issue below. An agency's decisions of 
general issues of law are reviewed for correctness. Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah 
Air Quality Bd.. 2006 UT 74, ^ [13, 148 P.3d 960. 
3. Did the respondents err in deciding that Benson had failed to show that he was 
disparately treated? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondents 
agree with the petitioner that he preserved this issue below. An agency's explanation for 
alleged disparate treatment is reviewed for reasonableness and rationality. Taylor v. 
Dep^t of Commerce. 952 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah App. 1998). 
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4. Did the Director of POST abuse his discretion in refusing to permit Benson to 
take the waiver examination for recertification? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondents 
agree with the petitioner that he preserved this issue below. Where an agency has been 
granted discretion by the legislature, its decision is reviewed for reasonableness. Salt 
Lake County v. Labor Comm'n. 2009 UT App 112, f9, 208 P.3d 1087. 
5. Are the findings of fact of the administrative law judge supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondents 
agree with the petitioner that he preserved this issue below. "Substantial evidence exists 
when the factual findings support more than a mere scintilla of evidence . . . though 
something less than the weight of the evidence." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 
2007 UT 42,1J35, 164 P.3d 384 (internal quotations omitted) ("An administrative law 
decision meets the substantial evidence test when 'a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate' the evidence supporting the decision.") 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 20,2007, the Director of Utah's Peace Officer Standards and 
Training (POST) sent a letter to Ron Benson. The letter indicated that, based on POST'S 
investigation and Benson's admissions, that Benson's certification as a peace officer had 
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lapsed and he was not authorized to act as a peace officer in the State of Utah. R. 1. This 
letter was withdrawn on April 25, 2007 based on Benson's request that he be given an 
administrative adjudicative proceeding. R. 2. 
On May 10, 2007, an administrative complaint was issued. R. 3-9. An evidentiary 
hearing was held on December 18, 2007. R. 737. On February 29, 2008, Administrative 
Law Judge Cheryl D. Luke issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order. R. 323-28. 
Benson requested review of the administrative law judge's recommended order on 
March 14, 2010. R. 329-31. Final agency action, upholding Judge Luke's decision, was 
entered on June 11, 2010. R. 386-402. Benson filed his petitioner for judicial review on 
July 9,2010. R. 403-24. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Administrative Law Judge Cheryl D. Luke entered the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The footnote is part of the original findings of fact. 
Findings of Fact 
1. Ronald Benson was a duly POST certified law enforcement 
officer employed in a recognized law enforcement position until January 1, 
2000. 
2. On or about January 1, 2000, Ronald Benson took a position in the 
private sector that did not involve the performance of duties as a certified 
peace officer. 
3. Ronald Benson remained employed in a field other than law 
enforcement for a period in excess of four years and his peace officer 
certification lapsed under Utah Code Annotated §53-6-208. 
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4. On or about March 2004 Ronald Benson was hired for a position 
with the Department of Corrections that required peace officer certification. 
5. Ronald Benson sought recertification from POST and made 
contact with a POST employee, a "tech", Jamie Garn, who informed him 
that if he could prove he had been a reserve officer during the four year 
period from 2000- 2004 his certification would not be considered lapsed 
and he would not require recertification. 
6. Ronald Benson made contact with supervisory employees at 
corrections and obtained a letter indicating that he had been a reserve 
officer during the four-year period. This letter was written by Leo Lucy 
(hereafter the "Lucy letter"). 
7. POST accepted the letter and sent correspondence to Mr. Benson 
that he remained certified as a law enforcement officer. 
8. An audit at the Department of Corrections1 was undertaken by the 
Utah State Legislature. During the audit questions were raised concerning 
Mr. Benson's employment. There were complaints that he had been able to 
avoid POST recertification processes by being given the Lucy letter. A 
co-worker alleged that Mr. Benson had not in fact been a reserve officer and 
that the letter was therefore false. 
9. During the audit questions arose concerning the letter written for 
Mr. Benson which had been submitted to POST to verify continuous law 
enforcement activity. An internal investigation demonstrated that there 
were internal inconsistencies which would not support Mr. Benson having 
been supervised by Mr. Lucy and further demonstrated that by even the 
most liberal interpretation Mr. Benson had not performed duties which 
supported a letter verifying him as a reserve officer. 
10. At the hearing it became clear that Mr. Lucy and another 
supervisor, Mr. Brent Cardall, had an interpersonal conflict and that during 
the Corrections audit the Benson matter became a matter of investigation 
largely as a result of Mr. Cardall wanting to have Mr. Lucy's actions looked 
into. 
1
 A report of the Audit was dated December 2006. 
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11. The Department of Corrections has very specific rules regulating 
reserve officer status that included conditions that they take an oath, receive 
a monthly stipend, have a badge issued, be assigned to a supervisor, Neither 
the supervisor that issued the letter to Mr. Benson nor Mr. Benson admitted 
to awareness of the policy regarding Correction Department reserve officer 
status. 
12. The Department of Corrections also had a reserve officer 
agreement form. The Lucy letter indicated that the agreement had been 
signed but clearly it was never implemented and that is why Mr. Benson did 
not have a monthly stipend etc. In fact it was the reference in the letter to a 
"Region IV" assignment that proved that in fact there was not a valid 
reserve officer assignment. The supervisor of region IV testified that Mr. 
Benson had not worked as a reserve officer in his region. 
13. Mr. Benson himself testified that his only activity as a 
Corrections Department reserve officer during the four years in question 
was based on his previous work with the Department of Corrections (prior 
to 1998 when he left the Dept. of Corrections). He indicated that he 
maintained connections with prison informants and passed along "tips" 
about prison activity to former co-workers. He in fact could only recall one 
incident in the four years in which he passed on a tip. 
14. The former director of Corrections, Scott Carver, and a former 
internal affair investigator, Mr. Hanks, testified at the hearing regarding the 
letter written for Mr. Benson that resulted in the continuation of his POST 
certification. It was clear that Mr. Benson had gotten the letter as a result of 
an institutionally accepted lax attitude in helping former employees retain 
their POST certification by allowing such letters to be written based on a 
relationship rather than factual basis. Mr. Hanks opined that the letter was 
"fabricated". 
15. All evidence indicated that Mr. Benson is a respected employee 
at corrections and in the law enforcement community. 
16. Mr. Benson has substantial law enforcement credentials and he 
was in a position to know and understand that his informal and almost 
non-existent "informant tip" conduct did not constituted acting as a reserve 
officer under any criteria. Mr. Benson testified that he did not know why 
the Lucy letter referenced Region IV because he admitted he did not work 
at anytime for Region IV. Mr. Benson engaged in opportunistic 
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exploitation of the lax system in place at the prison. In obtaining and 
submitting the letter to POST in an effort to counter a finding that his 
certification had lapsed he willfully submitted falsified information to 
POST to obtain certified status. 
17. Mr. Benson has submitted himself to POST and attempted to 
remedy the problem by taking a recertification test, which is allowed if 
approved for waiver by the POST director. Mr. Benson took the test 
without the Director having granted a waiver. Mr. Benson has passed that 
test but the Director of POST has refused to recertify him without 
readmission and graduation from the POST academy. 
Conclusions of Law 
Under Utah Code Annotated §53-6-208 Peace Officer certification is 
inactive if there has been a period of one year without being engaged in the 
duties of law enforcement. If the inactivity continues for a period of four 
years the certification lapses. If a certification has lapsed the statute 
requires that the Officer must recertify by attending and qualifying through 
the POST academy or obtain a waiver from the Director of POST under 
Utah Code Annotated §53-6-206. 
Utah Code Section 53-13-111 regulates reserve peace officers and 
requires that they meet basic and in-service training requirements of the 
peace officer classification in which they will function and that they have a 
supervising agency. 
Mr. Benson did not serve in a capacity that could be defined has 
having been "engaged in the duties" of law enforcement. Under any 
reading of reserve status or just common sense passing on at most one 
informant tip in a casual manner in four years will support a finding that his 
law enforcement certification was inactive and ultimately lapsed. Mr, 
Benson participated in obtaining and presenting a letter that if not fabricated 
as opined by Investigator Hanks did not contain the truth about his 
assignment and status. Mr. Benson himself testified that he did not know 
where the "Region IV" language came from but he did nothing to correct 
the impression that he was a reserve officer supervised in Region IV for the 
Department of Corrections. Mr. Benson's has extensive law enforcement 
experience and it is not credible that he would not have had an 
understanding that he had to be actively engaged in the duty of law 
enforcement to avoid a lapse in his licensure and that the so called passing 
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on of an informant tip would not be considered active law enforcement 
work. 
Argument was made that POST cannot ask to "refuse" waiver and 
certification because they had previously issued a certification. I find that 
Mr. Benson cannot try to stand on the action that his willful submission of 
false information caused to happen. In fact he was not certified because the 
agency action was based on the false and misleading information Mr. 
Benson provided. 
R. 323-28. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ron Benson, a certified peace officer, worked in a non-law enforcement job for a 
period of over four years. This caused his peace officer certification to lapse. When 
Benson returned to law enforcement, he sought to avoid the lapse of his certification by 
claiming to have been a reserve peace officer during that four-year period. While initially 
accepting Benson's claim, POST'S later investigation found that he had not acted as a 
reserve peace officer and his certification was refused. Petitioner does not challenge this 
decision on appeal. 
POST was not equitably estopped from reaching this decision based on its initial, 
mistaken, granting of Benson's request to be certified. Estoppel can be used to rescue a 
party without fault from damage. But because it was Benson's actions that led to the 
mistaken initial decision on the part of POST, his unclean hands preclude his use of 
equitable estoppel. 
Petitioner claims that the final agency order goes beyond what the POST Council 
actually decided in adopting the entirely of the administrative law judge's decision. But 
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the council adopted the actual recommendation of the ALJ. The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law simply identify why the ALJ reached the recommended order that was 
adopted by the council. 
Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated because the respondents 
did not consider his disparate treatment claim. Petitioner argues that Mr. Lucey was not 
decertified for having written a letter to POST on behalf of petitioner which was believed 
to be misleading if not actually false. But a disparate treatment claim can only be brought 
concerning similarly situated employees. Mr. Lucey is not similarly situated to the 
petitioner. Mr. Lucey did not claim to have been a reserve peace officer to avoid having 
his peace officer certification considered lapsed. 
Where a peace officer's certification has lapsed, the Director of POST has 
discretion to authorize the taking of a waiver examination as an alternative to the officer 
having to attend a POST academy to be recertified. The POST Director did not abuse his 
discretion by refusing to permit Benson to use the waiver examination for recertification 
purposes given the circumstances of the petitioner's efforts to avoid the need to be 
recertified by claiming to have served as a reserve peace officer. 
Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence to challenge the findings of fact made 
by the administrative law judge. While attempting to marshal some evidence concerning 




I. PETITIONER CANNOT USE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL TO 
CHALLENGE THE RESPONDENTS REFUSAL OF BENSON'S 
PEACE OFFICER CERTIFICATION 
Given the information provided by the petitioner, and others at his request, that 
was misleading and possibly false, the respondents initially concluded that Benson was 
still certified as a peace officer because he had acted as a reserve officer during the over 
four-year period that he had not been employed as a peace officer. Respondents later 
investigation showed that Benson had not been a reserve officer. This led the respondents 
to refuse Benson's certification. Benson now claims that the respondents should be 
estopped from refusing his certification because of his reliance on POST'S original 
decision. 
The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) 
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd.. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990). 
But there is another element that must be shown before petitioner can seek 
equitable relief against the respondents. "Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to 
rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action by 
the wrong or neglect of another." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 
P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990) (quoting Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands. 549 P.2d 695, 697 
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(Utah 1976)). Benson is not without fault, nor was he deluded by the initial decision 
made by POST. Indeed, that decision was the result of the misleading information 
provided by Benson and others at his behest. 
"[A] party who seeks an equitable remedy must have acted in good faith and not in 
violation of equitable principles." Hone v. Hone. 2004 UT App 241, f7, 95 P.3d 1221. 
The administrative law judge expressly found that Benson knew and understood that his 
passing on one tip over a four-year period did not constitute working as a reserve peace 
officer. R. 326 f 16. This finding of fact has not been challenged on appeal. The 
respondents did not abuse their discretion in rejecting petitioner's claim of equitable 
estoppel. 
II. THE FINAL AGENCY ACTION PREPARED BY THE 
DIRECTOR OF POST CORRECTLY STATED THE DECISION OF 
THE POST COUNCIL 
Petitioner claims that the final agency action is erroneous because it adopted the 
ALJ's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation. Benson reads too 
narrowly the decision reached by the POST Council. That decision has to be considered 
in context. The administrative law judge made not only findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, but she also prepared her recommendation and order. 
Mr. Benson was not engaged in the duties of a law enforcement 
officer from January 1, 2000 to March 2004. His certification lapsed and is 
subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-208. The 
Director of POST has the authority and discretion to allow for reinstatement 
by waiver exam and the evidence supports the exercise of discretion. POST 
has met its burden in proving Count I of the Administrative Complaint and 
the refusal to recertify by waiver is appropriate. 
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R. 327. 
The recommended order does not mention the reasons why Benson's certification 
lapsed. These are found in the preceding findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based 
on the misleading and false information provided by Benson and others, she made her 
recommendation that petitioner's peace officer certification be found to have lapsed. This 
is the only recommendation made to the POST Council. There was no recommendation 
that the council make a separate finding of use of false or misleading information. The 
remainder of the recommendation goes to the Director of POST, where the ALJ found 
that a decision not to permit Benson to use a waiver exam to be recertified was 
appropriate given the facts of this case. 
In presenting the ALJ's recommendation to the council, POST quoted the first two 
sentences of ALJ Cheryl Luke's recommendation verbatim. Its recommendation was that 
"the Council accept the ALJ's ruling that Benson's certification lapsed on January 1, 
2004." R. 800. As shown by the minutes of its meeting, POST Council decided to 
"accept the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that Ronald Benson"s peace 
officer certification lapsed in [sic] January 1, 2004." R. 757. 
The only difference between the POST Council's decision and that of the ALJ is 
that the date of Benson's certification is stated. The entirety of the ALJ's 
recommendation was accepted. Nothing in the decision states that any of the factual 
findings or legal conclusions upon which the recommendation was based were rejected by 
the council. The same is shown by the actual language in which the motion was made. 
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But you have to go back to the ALJ's hearing and their facts and 
findings of fact. So even though I have great concerns and I think there's a 
lot of gray area in this case, I will make the motion that we accept the ALJ's 
ruling that Benson's certification lapsed on January the 1st, 2004. 
R. 738 at 46. 
Counsel for Benson then sought a further explanation of what the decision 
entailed. The movant explained that he was merely restating the recommendation from 
POST that the ALJ's recommendation be accepted. R. 738 at 47. Nothing in the decision 
reached by the POST Council rejected the underlying findings and conclusions used by 
the ALJ to support her recommendation. The recommendation was accepted without 
alteration or change. The council had the right to concur or reject the recommendation, or 
issue an alternative recommendation. Utah Admin. R. 728-409-19(A)(1). The record 
shows that the council concurred in the recommendation. 
The Director of POST'S final agency action is not erroneous. The council 
concurred in the recommendation of the ALJ. It did not alter that recommendation or 
reject any part of the underlying findings and conclusions. The Director correctly stated 
that the council had adopted the ALJ's decision. 
The entirety of petitioner's argument is based on his belief that the final agency 
action does not meet the requirements of Utah Admin. R. 728-409-20(A)(l). 
After a majority of the council recommends to refuse, suspend or 
revoke respondent's peace officer, correctional officer, reserve/auxiliary 
officer, or special function officer certification, or to take no action against 
respondent, the director shall prepare and issue a final order within 30 days 
outlining the council's decision. 
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Benson claims that the final agency action, in adopting the entirety of the ALJ's 
decision, went beyond the council's actual order. But the regulation is contrary to the 
applicable statute. "The council shal l . . . advise the director regarding . . the refusal, 
suspension, or revocation of certification of a peace officer." Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-
107(l)(a)(ii) (West 2004). Advise is "[t]o give an opinion or counsel or recommend a 
plan or course of action." Black's Law Dictionary 50 (5th ed. 1979). Utah's statutes only 
give the council the power to advise the Director of POST on matters of refusing 
certification of a peace officer. Rules cannot change the statute. Draughon v. Dep't of 
Fin. Inst., 975 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah App. 1999) ("Administrative regulations "may not 
conflict with the design of an Act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate 
them.") (internal quotations omitted). The final agency action of the Director of POST in 
this matter cannot be invalidated by a claim that it was different from the advice given to 
the Director by the POST Council. 
III. BENSON'S DISPARATE TREATMENT ARGUMENT FAILS 
BECAUSE LUCEY IS NOT A SIMILARLY SITUATED 
INDIVIDUAL 
Benson claims that he received disparate treatment because his certification was 
refused while Lucey was not decertified for his actions in trying to help Benson obtain 
certification. Petitioner argues that respondents erred in not addressing this issue, though 
he admits that the ALJ rejected it, though on grounds he believes to be erroneous. Brief 
of Appellant at 30-31. 
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Benson's claim should be rejected because he has failed to raise a valid disparate 
treatment claim. Such a claim requires that Benson show disparate treatment between 
himself a similarly situated individuals. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n. 
2000 UT App 235, f31, 8 P.3d 1048 ("Meaningful disparate treatment can only be found 
when similar factual circumstances led to a different result without explanation."). In 
Kelly, this Court rejected efforts to claim inconsistent treatment because the other actions 
were not sufficiently similar to that imposed on the petitioner. 
The same is true of Benson's claims relating to Lucey. Benson's certification was 
refused because he was found not to have served as a reserve peace officer during the four 
years he was out of law enforcement as he had claimed. There is no claim that Lucey was 
erroneously certified when he had not actually been serving as a peace officer. At most 
he could be accused of providing false or misleading information concerning whether or 
not Benson had been a peace officer. There is no showing that Benson and Lucey are 
similarly situated. 
To defeat a claim of disparate treatment, all that is required is that the agency's 
action have a fair and rational basis. Taylor v. Dep't of Commerce. 952 P.2d 1090, 1095 
(Utah App. 1998). It is fair and rational to refuse to certify an individual whose 
certification had lapsed while not decertifying another peace officer who might be 
accused of providing false or misleading information in an effort to help another obtain 
certification. 
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IV. THE DIRECTOR OF POST DID NOT ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING BENSON TO BE CERTIFIED 
BASED ON A WAIVER EXAMINATION 
As an alternative to attending a POST academy to be recertified, an officer whose 
certification has lapsed can also seek permission to take a waiver examination instead: 
The director may waive the required basic peace officer training and 
certify each applicant who passes a written examination, an oral 
examination, or both a written and oral examination that affirms the 
applicants ability in law enforcement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-206(1) (West 2004). 
This statute does not grant a right to take a waiver examination instead of being 
required to attend basic peace officer training. Instead, it gives the Director of POST the 
discretion to permit such a waiver when he believes that would be appropriate. That 
discretion was not abused in this case. 
Benson claims that he was not treated similarly to other officers whose 
certification had lapsed and were permitted to take a waiver exam. But the petitioner has 
failed to show that the other officers were similarly situated. "Meaningful disparate 
treatment can only be found when similar factual circumstances led to a different result 
without explanation." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at %31. Benson, "must, at a minimum, 
carry the burden of showing some meaningful disparity of treatment between [himself] 
and other similarly situated employees." Id. at <[30. 
Petitioner erroneously relies on examples of others whose certification had lapsed 
and were permitted to take a waiver exam. Brief of Appellant at 34-35. But he has failed 
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to carry his burden of showing that these other officers were similarly situated. No 
evidence was provided that showed any other officer had claimed to have been a reserve 
officer to avoid having his certification lapse and then sought to take the waiver exam 
once it was shown that he had not served as a reserve officer. 
The fatal flaw in Kelly's claim of inconsistency is that none of her 
fellow officers have taken their sanctionable violations that one additional 
step after being given a letter warning of termination for any additional 
violation. 
Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at f 33 (emphasis in original). 
Petitioner has failed to show that any similarly situated individual was treated 
differently than he was. It was reasonable for the Director of POST to refuse Benson 
permission to use a waiver exam under these circumstances. The decision of the 
respondents should be affirmed. 
V. BENSON FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT 
SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT 
Benson asks this Court to use the wrong standard of review in considering his 
challenges to the facts as found by the Administrative Law Judge. Brief of Appellant at 
35-36. Utah's Administrative Procedures Act states: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:... 
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g) (West 2009). See also Sierra Club v. Utah Air 
Quality Bd„ 2006 UT 74,1J9,148 P.3d 960. 
Petitioner claims that a harsher standard should be used because of the language of 
a POST regulation. But rules cannot change the statute. Draughon v. Dep't of Fin. Inst., 
975 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah App. 1999) ("Administrative regulations "may not conflict with 
the design of an Act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate them.") (internal 
quotations omitted). The factual findings of the respondents should be upheld if there is 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence that supports them in the record. 
Substantial evidence exists when the factual findings support "more than a 
mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the 
evidence." An administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence 
test when "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" the evidence 
supporting the decision. 
Martinez v. Media-Pavmaster Plus. 2007 UT 42, T|35, 164 P.3d 384 (citation omitted). 
Benson asks this Court to overturn the district court's findings of fact. In doing so, 
he lists some of the evidence brought out in the evidentiary hearing below in his 
statement of facts. He also lists other evidence in his argument, but does not identify the 
particular findings of fact that he seeks to challenge. Nor does petitioner present all of the 
evidence supporting the findings of fact and then demonstrate that there is a fatal flaw in 
that evidence. Benson has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the evidence. This 
Court should therefore reject his challenges to the respondents' factual findings. A party 
challenging the district court's factual findings has a duty to marshal the evidence. 
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It is the Plaintiffs1 responsibility to marshal the evidence to 
demonstrate that the factual findings made by the trial court were erroneous. 
Specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to "marshal all the 
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact.11 
Save Our Schs. v. Bd. of Educ, 2005 UT 55, [^10, 122 P.3d 611 (citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
[t]his assignment is not intended to gratuitously oppress an appellant; 
rather it exists to facilitate a structured, realistic, and skeptical appraisal of 
facts without unduly compromising the adversarial process. At its core, the 
duty to marshal evidence contemplates that an appellant present "every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists" and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence," becoming a "devil's advocate." 
InreEJHL 2006 UT 36, f64, 137 P.3d 809. 
Simply providing a list of the evidence does not satisfy the marshaling 
requirement. United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower, 2006 UT 35, f26, 140 P.3d 
1200 ("presenting evidence supporting the challenged conclusion does not satisfy the 
marshaling requirement. Parties cannot discharge their duty by 'simply providing] an 
exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial.5"). Even an exhaustive listing of the 
evidence is not enough. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 
(Utah App. 1991) ("extensive quotations from the record" found to be insufficient where 
the appellant did not meet its burden of marshaling every scrap of evidence that supported 
every challenged finding of fact and then demonstrate the fatal flaw in the evidence). 
What the City has not done is to correlate particular items of evidence with 
the challenged findings and convince us of the court's missteps in 
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application of the evidence to its findings. The findings, then, have not been 
shown to be clearly erroneous. In the instant appeal, the challenge to the 
legal conclusions rises and falls with the factual findings sought to be 
challenged. Accordingly, we leave undisturbed the court's findings and the 
conclusions based thereon. 
West Vallev City. 818 P.2d at 1315. 
Benson claims that the Lucey memo did not contain false information. Brief of 
Appellant at 43-45. This memo stated that "Retired officer Ron Benson signed a reserve 
officer agreement with the Department of Corrections region IV office of adult probation 
and parole dated 2-9-2000." R. 481. But Lucey's testimony was not that such an 
agreement was signed with the department on that date, but rather that Benson had gotten 
a packet to be a reserve officer and had partially filled it out in Lucey's office. R. 737 at 
172-74. Lucey testified that he did not know if Benson had ever signed the agreement 
and did not know if he had made an agreement with region IV to serve as a reserve 
officer. IcL at 175-76. All Lucey knew was that region IV was the region that Benson 
said he was going where the petitioner mentioned he wanted to be a reserve officer. IdL at 
176. There is more than a scintilla of evidence to show that this memo was either false or 
misleading. 
In generically challenging any findings that Benson wilfully submitted falsified 
information to POST, petitioner has failed to include much of the evidence that was relied 
upon by the respondents. Benson claimed to have served as a reserve peace officer with 
the Department of Corrections. His own testimony showed that the only actions he had 
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taken in over four years as an alleged reserve officer was to pass on a single tip. R. 325. 
This finding of fact has not been challenged. 
16. Mr. Benson has substantial law enforcement credentials and he 
was in a position to know and understand that his informal and almost 
non-existent "informant tip" conduct did not constituted acting as a reserve 
officer under any criteria. Mr. Benson testified that he did not know why 
the Lucy letter referenced Region IV because he admitted he did not work 
at anytime for Region IV. Mr. Benson engaged in opportunistic 
exploitation of the lax system in place at the prison. In obtaining and 
submitting the letter to POST in an effort to counter a finding that his 
certification had lapsed he willfully submitted falsified information to 
POST to obtain certified status. 
R. 326. 
This finding of fact has not been challenged either. There was more than a 
scintilla of evidence to support the finding that Benson's claim to have served as a reserve 
peace officer was willfully false and misleading. 
Finally, Benson claims there was no evidence to support the finding that his 
application to be allowed to use the waiver examination was denied. Brief of Appellant at 
48-50. Benson admits that there was evidence that it was '"in essence5 denied, although 
no written denial beyond the February 20,2007, letter that Mr. Benson was not a reserve 
officer (which was later rescinded) was ever issued." Id. at 49. Benson also claimed it 
was important that the current Director of POST was not called to testify that he had 
denied Benson's request. Petitioner claims this invalidates the final agency action. 
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But petitioner fails to recognize that the final agency action was itself came from 
the Director of POST. R. 386-87. In that document, the Director of POST expressly 
upheld the finding that he had refused Benson's request. 
Petitioner has failed to show that the relevant findings of fact are unsupported by 
substantial evidence in the record. He has not challenged the finding that he did not serve 
as a reserve peace officer that underlies the decision to refuse him certification. The final 
agency action should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the respondents ask this Court to affirm the final 
agency action. 
Respectfully submitted this J 6 day of July, 2010. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
53-6-107. General duties of council. 
(1) The council shall: 
(a) advise the director regarding: 
(i) the approval, certification, or revocation of certification of any certified academy 
established in the state; 
(ii) the refusal, suspension, or revocation of certification of a peace officer; 
(iii) minimum courses of study, attendance requirements, and the equipment and 
facilities to be required at a certified academy; 
(iv) minimum qualifications for instructors at a certified academy; 
(v) the minimum basic training requirements that peace officers shall complete before 
receiving certification; 
(vi) the minimum basic training requirements that dispatchers shall complete before 
receiving certification; and 
(vii) categories or classifications of advanced in-service training programs and 
minimum courses of study and attendance requirements for the categories or 
classifications; 
(b) recommend that studies, surveys, or reports, or all of them be made by the director 
concerning the implementation of the objectives and purposes of this chapter; 
(c) make recommendations and reports to the commissioner and governor from time to 
time; and 
(d) perform other acts as necessary to carry out the duties of the council in this chapter. 
(2) The council may approve special function officers for membership in the Public 
Safety Retirement System in accordance with Sections 49-14-201 and 49-15-201. 
53-6-206. Waiver of training course requirement — Certification exam. 
(1) The director may waive the required basic peace officer training and certify each 
applicant who passes a written examination, an oral examination, or both a written and 
oral examination that affirms the applicant's ability in law enforcement. 
(2) A waiver applicant shall: 
(a) furnish evidence of satisfactory completion of a peace officer training program 
that, in the director's judgment, is equivalent to the program required for certification in 
this state; and 
(b) furnish evidence that the requirements of Section 53-6-203, relating to 
qualifications for admission to the Utah training programs have been met. 
(3) A waiver applicant may not exercise peace officer powers until all waiver process 
requirements have been met. 
(4) An applicant who fails the certification examination must complete the basic 
training course required by this part and be certified in order to become a peace officer 
authorized to exercise peace officer powers. 
53-6-208. Inactive certificates — Lapse of certificate — Reinstatement 
(1) (a) The certificate of a peace officer who has not been actively engaged in 
performing the duties of a peace officer for one year shall be designated "inactive." 
(b) If a peace officer having an inactive certificate becomes reemployed or 
subsequently reengaged as a peace officer, his certificate may be reissued or reinstated by 
the director upon successful completion by that peace officer of the waiver process 
established by the director. 
(c) The director may require a peace officer with an inactive certificate to successfully 
complete the basic training course before reissuing or reinstating certification. 
(2) (a) The certificate of a peace officer lapses if he has not been actively engaged in 
performing the duties of a peace officer for four continuous years. 
(b) Subject to Section 53-6-206, the peace officer shall successfully complete the basic 
training course before the certificate may be reissued or reinstated. 
63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action 
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making 
body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agencyfs prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
ADDENDUM "B 
State of Utah 
Department of Public Safety 
SCOTT T DUNCAN 
Commissioner 
June 11, 2008 
Ron Benson 
7135 South Waymar Cir. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
RE: Refusal of Benson's Request for Certification 
FINAL ORDER 
Dear Mr. Benson; 
Pursuant to administrative rule R728-409-20, you are hereby informed that on the 9th day of June 2008, 
the Peace Officer Standards and Training Council voted to accept and approve the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order (exhibit A). Specifically the 
Council finds that you were not engaged in the duties of a law enforcement officer from January 1, 2000 
to March 2004 and that your certification lapsed and is subject to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§53-6-208. The Director of POST has the authority and discretion to allow for reinstatement by waiver 
exam. While the record would reflect that you took the reinstatement waiver exam on January 18, 2007, a 
subsequent review of the documents you submitted raised a few questions as follows: 1) Whether you 
qualified for the reinstatement waiver exam; and 2) Whether your certification as a peace officer lapsed 
where you had not been actively engaged in performing the duties of a peace officer for four continuous 
years pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §53-6-208(2)(a). In addition, it is noted in the Administrative 
Law Judge's Findings of Fact that you took the test without the Director of POST having granted a 
waiver, as required by Utah Code Annotated, is supported by the evidence. 
The record further reflects that on February 20, 2007, the Director of POST sent you a letter (exhibit B) 
advising that you did not have statutory authority to act as a peace officer in the State of Utah. The 
Director of POST withdrew this letter by a subsequent letter dated April 25, 2007 (exhibit C) based on 
your request for the initiation of an administrative adjudicative proceeding pursuant to the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act at Utah Code §63-46b-l, et. seq. On May 11, 2007 the POST 
administrative complaint (exhibit D) was filed in this matter where a key issue was whether the Director 
of POST properly exercised his authority and discretion in denying your request to reinstate your 
certification by waiver exam. POST Council affirms and adopts the Administrative Law Judge's 
recommendation and order that the Director's refusal to reinstate your certification by waiver exam was 
within his authority, discretion and was appropriate. Specifically, the fact you were not engaged in the 
duties of a law enforcement officer from January 1, 2000 to March 2004, supports the administrative law 
judge's finding that your certification lapsed. 
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It is also significant to note the Administrative Law Judges Findings of Facts that you obtained and 
submitted documents to POST in an effort to counter a finding that your certification had lapsed. 
The ALJ found that you willfully submitted falsified information to POST to obtain certified status. 
The Council accepts these findings of fact in support of the Agency Action taken herein. 
This letter constitutes the Final Order regarding the Council's decision. This final order is based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative hearing and/or on facts officially noted. 
STATEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION 
POST Council affirms and adopts the Administrative Law Judge's Recommendation and Order that your 
certification lapsed and was subject to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §53-6-208. POST Council 
affirms and adopts the Administrative Law Judge's Recommendation and Order that the Director's 
refusal to reinstate your certification by waiver exam was within his authority, discretion and was 
appropriate. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Council accepts and approves the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order as if 
fully set forth herein. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPLY FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13, any party shall have the right to apply for reconsideration by 
POST Council, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested in writing to the POST 
Council, 410 West 9800 South, Sandy, Utah 84070, within 20 days from the date this Final Order was 
issued. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL ORDER 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and § 63-46b-16, a party aggrieved may obtain judicial review 
of final agency action by filing a petition for judicial review within 30 days after the date that the order 
constituting final agency action is issued or considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-
13(3)(b). To seek judicial review of final agency action, resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, 
the party shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court. 
il 
con; Stephenson, Director POST 
CC: Phil Dyer 
221 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Address: 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 • Telephone: (801) 965-4461 • Fax: (801) 965-4608 
£1fc v^k 
BEFORE THE 
COUNCIL ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PEACE OFFICER CERTIFICATION 
OF: 
RONALD W. BENSON 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Case number 07-003LE 
The above referenced matter was heard by Administrative Law Judge, Cheryl D. 
Luke on the 18 day of December, 2007. Said hearing was held as a formal hearing 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-6 to 11, as 
amended. 
CASE SUMMARY 
Peace Officer Standards and Training (hereafter "POST") is a duly authorized 
council of the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §53-6-106 and has jurisdiction 
over this action under Utah Code Ann. §53-6-211 and Administrative Rule R728-6-211. 
POST served an administrative complaint on Ronald W. Benson alleging that Mr. 
Benson's Peace Officer Certification had lapsed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §53-6-
208(2)(a) since he was not actively engaged in performing the duties of a peace officer 
for four continuous years. POST requested that Ronald W. Benson's request for Peace 
Officer Certification be refused. 
Count I: 
Count One alleged that Mr. Benson had engaged in the willful falsification of information 
under Utah Code Ann. §53-6-21 l(l)(d)(I) and R728-409-3 (A) in providing information 
to POST that he had been working as a reserve officer for the Department of Corrections 
during the four year period when in fact he had not. 
Count II: 
Count Two of the Administrative Complaint was dismissed at the hearing with no 
objection from Mr. Benson. 
Response and Defense: 
Mr. Benson filed a written answer to the complaint in which he argued that POST had 
failed to state a cause of action. Specifically it was argued that POST had already 
reinstated Mr. Benson and that therefore a refusal was not at issue and caused a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Further argument 
was made that POST had relied on Section 53-6-211(1) (d) (v) (1998) which Mr. Benson 
argued was constitutionally vague, ambiguous and overbroad. Mr. Benson also argued 
that any rules regulating refusal for certification went beyond the statutory provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §53-6-105(1) (c) (1995) which he alleges allow only for rules related to 
"standards for revocation of certification". 
Mr. Benson also denied that he had submitted any false information to POST indicating 
that he reasonably believed that he worked as a reserve officer for the Department of 
Corrections and that his certification had not lapsed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter was set for hearing on November 17, 2007. Counsel for Mr. Benson 
objected requesting more time to complete discovery and filing several discovery 
motions. POST objected. The Court granted the continuance and on November 17, 2007 
a pre-hearing was held in which the discovery concerns were addressed and the matter 
was set for hearing on December 18, 2007. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Ronald Benson was a duly POST certified law enforcement officer employed in a 
recognized law enforcement position until January 1, 2000. 
2. On or about January 1, 2000, Ronald Benson took a position in the private sector that 
did not involve the performance of duties as a certified peace officer. 
3. Ronald Benson remained employed in a field other than law enforcement for a period 
in excess of four years and his peace officer certification lapsed under Utah Code 
Annotated §53-6-208. 
4. On or about March 2004 Ronald Benson was hired for a position with the Department 
of Corrections that required peace officer certification. 
5. Ronald Benson sought recertification from POST and made contact with a POST 
employee, a "tech", Jamie Garn, who informed him that if he could prove he had been 
a reserve officer during the four year period from 2000- 2004 his certification would 
not be considered lapsed and he would not require recertification. 
6. Ronald Benson made contact with supervisory employees at corrections and obtained 
a letter indicating that he had been a reserve officer during the four-year period. This 
letter was written by Leo Lucy (hereafter the "Lucy letter"). 
7. POST accepted the letter and sent correspondence to Mr. Benson that he remained 
certified as a law enforcement officer. 
8. An audit at the Department of Corrections1 was undertaken by the Utah State 
Legislature. During the audit questions were raised concerning Mr. Benson's 
employment. There were complaints that he had been able to avoid POST 
recertification processes by being given the Lucy letter. A co-worker alleged that Mr. 
Benson had not in fact been a reserve officer and that the letter was therefore false. 
9. During the audit questions arose concerning the letter written for Mr. Benson which 
had been submitted to POST to verify continuous law enforcement activity. An 
internal investigation demonstrated that there were internal inconsistencies which 
would not support Mr. Benson having been supervised by Mr. Lucy and further 
demonstrated that by even the most liberal interpretation Mr. Benson had not 
performed duties which supported a letter verifying him as a reserve officer. 
10. At the hearing it became clear that Mr. Lucy and another supervisor, Mr. Brent 
Cardall, had an interpersonal conflict and that during the Corrections audit the 
Benson matter became a matter of investigation largely as a result of Mr. Cardall 
wanting to have Mr. Lucy's actions looked into. 
11. The Department of Corrections has very specific rules regulating reserve officer 
status that included conditions* that they take an oath, receive a monthly stipend, have 
a badge issued, be assigned to a supervisor, Neither the supervisor that issued the 
letter to Mr. Benson nor Mr. Benson admitted to awareness of the policy regarding 
Correction Department reserve officer status. 
12. The Department of Corrections also had a reserve officer agreement form. The Lucy 
letter indicated that the agreement had been signed but clearly it was never 
implemented and that is why Mr. Benson did not have a monthly stipend etc. In fact 
it was the reference in the letter to a "Region IV" assignment that proved that in fact 
there was not a valid reserve officer assignment. The supervisor of region IV testified 
that Mr. Benson had not worked as a reserve officer in his region. 
13. Mr. Benson himself testified that his only activity as a Corrections Department 
reserve officer during the four years in question was based on his previous work with 
the Department of Corrections (prior to 1998 when he left the Dept. of Corrections). 
He indicated that he maintained connections with prison informants and passed along 
"tips" about prison activity to former co-workers. He in fact could only recall one 
incident in the four years in which he passed on a tip. 
14. The former director of Corrections, Scott Carver, and a former internal affair 
investigator, Mr. Hanks, testified at the hearing regarding the letter written for Mr. 
Benson that resulted in the continuation of his POST certification. It was clear that 
Mr. Benson had gotten the letter as a result of an institutionally accepted lax attitude 
in helping former employees retain their POST certification by allowing such letters 
1
 A report of the Audit was dated December 2006 
to be written based on a relationship rather than factual basis. Mr. Hanks opined that 
the letter was "fabricated". 
15. All evidence indicated that Mr. Benson is a respected employee at corrections and in 
the law enforcement community. 
16. Mr. Benson has substantial law enforcement credentials and he was in a position to 
know and understand that his informal and almost non-existent "informant tip'1 
conduct did not constituted acting as a reserve officer under any criteria. Mr. Benson 
testified that he did not know why the Lucy letter referenced Region IV because he 
admitted he did not work at anytime for Region IV. Mr. Benson engaged in 
opportunistic exploitation of the lax system in place at the prison. In obtaining and 
submitting the letter to POST in an effort to counter a finding that his certification 
had lapsed he willfully submitted falsified information to POST to obtain certified 
status. 
17. Mr. Benson has submitted himself to POST and attempted to remedy the problem by 
taking a recertification test, which is allowed if approved for waiver by the POST 
director. Mr. Benson took the test without the Director having granted a waiver. Mr. 
Benson has passed that test but the Director of POST has refused to recertify him 
without readmission and graduation from the POST academy. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Under Utah Code Annotated §53-6-208 Peace Officer certification is inactive if 
there has been a period of one year without being engaged in the duties of law 
enforcement. If the inactivity continues for a period of four years the certification lapses. 
If a certification has lapsed the statute requires that the Officer must recertify by 
attending and qualifying through the POST academy or obtain a waiver from the Director 
of POST under Utah Code Annotated §53-6-206. 
Utah Code Section 53-13-111 regulates reserve peace officers and requires that 
they meet basic and in-service training requirements of the peace officer classification in 
which they will function and that they have a supervising agency. 
Mr. Benson did not serve in a capacity that could be defined has having been 
"engaged in the duties" of law enforcement. Under any reading of reserve status or just 
common sense passing on at most one informant tip in a casual manner in four years will 
support a finding that his law enforcement certification was inactive and ultimately 
lapsed. Mr. Benson participated in obtaining and presenting a letter that if not fabricated 
as opined by Investigator Hanks did not contain the truth about his assignment and status. 
Mr. Benson himself testified that he did not know where the "Region IV" language came 
from but he did nothing to correct the impression that he was a reserve officer supervised 
in Region IV for the Department of Corrections. Mr. Benson's has extensive law 
enforcement experience and it is not credible that he would not have had an 
understanding that he had to be actively engaged in the duty of law enforcement to avoid 
a lapse in his licensure and that the so called passing on of an informant tip would not be 
considered active law enforcement work. 
Argument was made that POST cannot ask to "refuse" waiver and certification 
because they had previously issued a certification. I find that Mr. Benson cannot try to 
stand on the action that his willful submission of false information caused to happen. In 
fact he was not certified because the agency action was based on the false and misleading 
information Mr. Benson provided. 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
Mr. Benson was not engaged in the duties of a law enforcement officer from 
January 1, 2000 to March 2004. His certification lapsed and is subject to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-208. The Director of POST has the authority and 
discretion to allow for reinstatement by waiver exam. In this case the Director of POST 
has refused reinstatement by waiver exam and the evidence supports the exercise of 
discretion. POST has met its burden in proving Count I of the Administrative Complaint 
and the refiisal to recertify by waiver is appropriate. 
Dated this _day of February, 2008 
Cheryl D. I ^ e 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Under POST Rule R728-409-18 any party may request review of this recommendation 
before POST Council. Request for that review must be made in writing within 15 days 
from the date of this Order of recommendation. 
If no request for review is made the matter will go before POST Council for a decision to 
be subject to the final order of the Director of POST under R728-409-20. 
Final Orders of the POST Director are subject to appeal before the Utah State Court of 
Appeals and are governed by the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-14 
and 15. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommended Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on February 29, 2008, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Scott Stephenson 
Post Director 
410 W 9800 S 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Lt. Steve Winward 
410 W 9800 S 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Ron Benson 
7135SWaymarCr. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Robert Morton 
Atty General Dept of Public Safety 
4501 S 2700 W 







btate or Utah 
Department of Public Safety 
SCOTT T.DUNCAN 
Commissioner 
Peace Officer Standards & Training 




7135 So. Waymar Circle 
Salt Lake City UT. 84121 
Dear Mr. Benson, 2/20/2007 
POST Investigation Bureau has concluded their investigation into your peace officer status. It was 
determined by the investigation and by your own admissions that you did not function as a "reserve 
Dfficer". This determination is based on state statute and Corrections policy. It is determined that your 
}eace officer status was inactive from January 2000 until March of 2004. Utah Code Annotated 53-6-
>08 (2) (a) states: 
"The certificate of a peace officer lapses if he has not been actively engaged in performing the duties of a 
leace officer for four continuous years. " 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 53-6-208 you do not have the statutory authority to act as a peace 
>fficer in the State of Utah. You should cease any and all activities as a peace officer until you 
successfully complete a basic training course. 
f you have any questions regarding this action, or need information on upcoming basic training courses, 
ou may contact Lt. Steven Winward at 256-2326. 
ichard Townsend 
>irector 
eace Officer Standards and Training 





State of Utah 
Department of Public Safety 
SCOTT T.DUNCAN 
Commissioner 
Peace Officer Standards & Training 
RICH TOWNSEND 
Director 
6 X t\A> 'r 
April 25,2007 
Mr. Ron Benson 
7135 So. Waymar Circle 
Salt Lake City UT. 84121 
Re: Notice of Withdrawal of POST Letter Dated February 20,2007. 
Dear Mr. Benson: 
The Division of Peace Officer Standards, Department of Public Safety, has made a determination 
to withdraw the letter dated February 20,2007 notifying you that your peace officer certification has 
lapsed due to your failure to be actively engaged in performing the duties of a peace officer for four 
continuous years. This determination to withdraw the letter is based on your request for the initiation of 
an administrative adjudicative proceeding pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act at Utah 
Code §§ 63-46b-l, e t seq. 
If you have additional questions or if the Division may be of further assistance, please contact Lt 
Steven Winward at 256-2326. 
Sincerely, 
Richard Townsend, Director 
Peace Officer Standards and Training 
cc: Utah Dept. of Corrections 
Phillip W. Dyer, Esq. 
410 W. 9800 So. Sandy UT 84070 • Telephone: (801) 256-2300* Fax: (801) 256-2391 
0lV> \p>r * 
Steven Winward 
Bureau Chief, Investigations 
Peace Officer Standards and Training 
410 W. 9800 So 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone: (801) 256-2326 
BEFORE THE 
COUNCIL ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PEACE OFFICER 
CERTIFICATION OF: 
RONALD W. BENSON 
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT 
CASE NO. 07-003LE 
Complainant, Lynn Nelson, Chairman of the Utah Council on Peace Officer Standards and 
Training, hereafter POST, alleges as follows: 
1. POST is a duly authorized council of the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-
106. 
2. Jurisdiction for this action is based on Utah Code Ann.§ 53-6-211 and upon 
POST Administrative Rule R728-409 for the refusal, suspension or revocation of peace 
officer certification. 
3. This complaint is also a notice of formal agency action. 
4. Ronald W. Benson graduated from Utah State Corrections Academy on or about April 1987 
and was employed at that time by the Department of Corrections in a position requiring peace 
officer certification. 
On or about November 2,1998, Ronald W. Benson left employment with the Department of 
Corrections and was employed by the Department of Insurance in a position requiring peace 
officer certification and he remained in that position until approximately January 1, 2000. 
On or about January 1, 2000, Ronald W. Benson resigned his employment with the 
Department of Insurance and accepted employment in the private sector that did not involve 
the performance of duties as a certified peace officer. 
On or about March 2004 Ronald W. Benson applied for a position with the Department of 
Corrections and was hired with Corrections as an Adult Probation and Parole Agent, a 
position requiring certification as a peace officer. 
Ronald W. Benson claimed to have worked as a reserve officer for the Department of 
Corrections during the period between January 1, 2000 and March 2004 and provided 
documentation to POST indicating that he was working as a reserve officer during this four-
year period. 
Ronald W. Benson was not employed by the Department of Corrections as a reserve officer 
during the period between January 1, 2000 and March 2004. 
Ronald W. Benson willfully provided false information to POST in an effort to obtain 
certified peace officer status and to prevent his peace officer certification from lapsing, 
pursuant to § 53-6-208(2)(a). 
On or about October 26, 2005, Ronald W. Benson was stopped by a UHP Trooper for 
speeding, at which time he activated his emergency lights and willfully gave false 
information to the UHP trooper regarding his destination and the reason he was speeding, in 
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an effort to avoid a speeding citation. 
As provided in the following paragraphs, Ronald W. Benson is alleged to have committed 
the acts enumerated below, which are in violation of Utah Code §53-6-21 l(l)(d)(i) willful 
falsification of any information to obtain certified status; Utah Administrative CodeR728-409-3 (A), 
willfully providing both written and verbal information that was false in order to obtain certified 
status; Utah Code §53-6-21 l(l)(d)(v) conduct or pattern of conduct that would tend disrupt, diminish 
or otherwise jeopardize public trust and fidelity in law enforcement; Utah Administrative Code 
R728-409-3(J)(l)(i) commission of an act which violates the peace officer's oath of office; and 
violation of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. 
COUNTI 
In January of 2000 Ronald W. Benson resigned from ail law enforcement agencies and went 
to work in the private sector in a position that did not require peace officer certification or the 
performance of duties as a peace officer. On or about March of 2004 Ronald W. Benson was rehired 
by the Department of Corrections to work as an Adult Probation and Parole Officer, a position 
requiring peace officer certification. Since he was not actively engaged in performing the duties of a 
peace officer for four continuous years, Ronald W. Benson's peace officer certification lapsed 
pursuant to Utah Code § 53-6-208(2)(a). Ronald W. Benson met with POST and provided both 
verbal and written information in an effort to obtain certified status that indicated that he had been 
working as a reserve law enforcement officer for the Department of Corrections during the four-year 
period of time between January 2000 and March 2004. Ronald W. Benson knew or should have 
known that the information that was provided to POST was false. POST updated Mr. Benson's 
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certification status to valid based on the false information that was provided to them. In January of 
2007 it was revealed to POST that Ronald W. Benson never worked as a reserve officer for the 
Department of Corrections and that the documentation that was provided to POST by Mr. Benson to 
obtain his certified status was false. The Department of Corrections did not recognize Ronald W. 
Benson as a reserve for their agency during the period January 2000 through March 2004. 
The conduct alleged in Count I constitutes a violation of R728-409-3 (A) and Utah Code 
Ann. §53-6-211(1 )(d)(i) as willful falsification of any information to obtain certified status, and 
further violates the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics and Oath of Office. 
COUNTH 
On October 26,2005, Trooper Paul Bailey of the Utah Highway Patrol made a traffic stop of 
Ronald W. Benson for speeding. During the stop, Mr. Benson activated the emergency lights of his 
vehicle in an attempt to persuade the officer that he was responding to an emergency. He then told 
the UHP trooper that he was responding to an investigation of a stabbing at the Gunnison Prison. 
Ronald W. Benson later admitted that he was actually going to firearms training, but continued to 
assert that he was also going to investigate a stabbing. In the early part of 2007, an audit of the 
Department of Corrections was released disclosing the improprieties by Ronald W. Benson during 
the traffic stop on October 26,2005. This incident received considerable media attention and in one 
interview with local media, Ronald W. Benson admitted that he had lied to the UHP trooper during 
the traffic stop. 
The conduct alleged in Count II constitutes a violation of Utah Code §53-6-211(1 )(d)(v) as 
conduct or a pattern of conduct that would tend disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopardize public trust 
and fidelity in law enforcement, Utah Administrative Code R728-409-3(J)(l)(i) commission of an 
act which violates the peace officer's oath of office; and violation of the Law Enforcement Code of 
4 
Ethics. 
WHEREFORE Steven C. Winward, Certification Bureau Chief, Peace Officer Standards 
and Training, hereby requests the REFUSAL of Ronald W. Benson's request for peace officer 
certification. 
BY THE UTAH COUNCIL ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING DATED 
this day of 2007. 
CHAIRMAN 
Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training 
OR FOR THE CHAIRMAN 
VICE-CHAIRMAN 
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NOTICE OF REQUIREMENT TO ANSWER 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6, and POST Administrative Rule R728-409-8, Respondent 
Ronald W. Benson, shall file a responsive pleading to this complaint within thirty (30) days of the 
mailing date of this Notice of Agency Action that shall include: 
1. The division's file number or other reference number; 
2. The name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
3. A statement of the relief that the respondent seeks; 
4. A state of facts; 
5. A statement summarizing the reason that the relief requested should be granted. 
The respondent's responsive pleading shall be addressed to: 
Utah Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training 
410 West 9800 So. 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Failure to do so may result in an order of default against Respondent. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
A formal hearing will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-6 
to 11, as amended. It will be scheduled at a location, date and time to be determined, pursuant to 
R728-409-11 of the Utah Administrative Rule. This matter shall be heard before Utah Peace Officer 
and Standard and Training Council, Lynn Nelson, Presiding Officer, at Peace Officer Standards and 
Training, 410 West. 9800 South, Sandy, UT 84070. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
The ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT to the following on this the day 
of , 2007: 
Ronald W. Benson 
7135 So. Way Mar Circle 
Salt Lake City UT 84121 
Certified Mail Hand Delivered (Circle appropriate method) 
